R&D drives long-run growth and is financed extensively with external equity, making it a potentially important mechanism linking capital income taxation with economic performance. Exploiting variation in corporate payout taxes in a broad international panel and in the years surrounding the 2003 US dividend tax cut, we document a robust negative association between payout tax rates and investment in R&D. Higher taxes on capital income (dividends and capital gains) have a stronger negative effect on R&D in more equity-dependent sectors and firms, but little impact on fixed capital spending, consistent with the equity financing mechanism we emphasize. The economic consequences of payout taxation are much larger than prior research suggests.
Introduction
Do taxes on capital income affect the real economy? Economists and policymakers have debated the consequences of corporate payout taxation for decades. 1 Although several studies find that tax rates on dividends and capital gains influence corporate payout policies and capital structure decisions (Chetty and Saez (2005) ; Lin and Flannery (2013) ), there is little indication that the real effects of payout taxes are sufficient to impact aggregate economic performance. For example, recent evidence suggests that even substantial cuts in dividend tax rates have almost no impact on corporate investment in fixed capital (Yagan (2015) ).
This study departs from prior work on the real effects of payout taxation by focusing on intangible investments in research and development (R&D) rather than the accumulation of physical capital. This shift in focus matters: in both a broad international panel and in the years surrounding the sizeable 2003 US dividend tax cut, we find that lower taxes on dividends and capital gains have a significant positive impact on R&D investments but, consistent with other recent work, little or no effect on investment in fixed capital. Reducing the effective tax rate on corporate payouts from 20% to 0% increases the overall average (long-run) rate of industry-level R&D investment by approximately 5%, with substantially stronger effects in sectors and firms that depend more on external equity finance, indicating the economic consequences of capital income taxation are considerably larger than previously thought.
There are two complementary reasons that focusing specifically on R&D yields important new insights on the economic effects of payout taxes. First, R&D is central to modern theories of endogenous economic growth, and there is widespread recognition that innovation rather than capital accumulation drives technological change and economic performance over the long run (e.g., Romer (1990) ; Aghion and Howitt (1992) ; R. G. King and Levine (1993) ; Grossman and Helpman (1994) ). Thus, it is arguably essential to look beyond investment in physical capital to fully evaluate the long-run economic implications of corporate payout taxation.
Second, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect that R&D will be particularly sensitive to payout tax rates. As the literature has long emphasized, higher taxes on corporate payouts increase the cost of financing with new stock issues, so the real consequences of payout taxation hinge on whether or not stock issues are the marginal source of funds for new investment (e.g., Poterba and Summers (1984) ; Auerbach (2002) ; Chetty and Saez (2010) ).
What this literature has not emphasized, however, is that some real activities are more equity-dependent than others. In particular, R&D investments are financed extensively with stock issues, in part because equity contracts have advantages over debt when it comes to funding intangible investments with distant and highly variable payoffs (e.g., Stiglitz (1985) ; Hall (2002) ; Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) ). As a consequence, higher tax rates on corporate payouts may have a much stronger negative impact on investment in R&D than on fixed capital spending, since innovative firms cannot perfectly substitute to (cheaper) debt to fund R&D when the cost of external equity increases. If so, focusing only on the response of fixed capital investment to changes in payout taxes will substantially underestimate the real effects of capital income taxation.
Our empirical analysis starts by studying how time-series changes in payout taxes affect R&D investment in a broad international panel. We merge data on yearly rates of dividend and capital gains taxation across countries from Jacob and Jacob (2013) with information on R&D activity at the country-industry-year level from the OECD's STAN database. Our baseline estimates show a negative, highly significant, and economically important relation between tax rates on capital income and R&D activity. That is, within-country reductions (increases) in payout tax rates are associated with significant overall increases (decreases) in the average level of R&D investment across industries. Moreover, building on the ideas in Rajan and Zingales (1998) , we use information on the financing activities of US firms to construct measures of each industry's technologically-driven dependence on external equity financing. When we estimate the overall relation between payout taxes and R&D investment separately for the industries with the highest and lowest dependence on external equity, we find that the broad inverse relation between payout taxation and R&D is driven entirely by changes in R&D in the most equity-dependent industries, the sectors that should be most affected by changes in the cost of external equity capital.
Our second set of tests focus more formally on the differential effects of payout taxes across industries. Specifically, we estimate difference-in-differences regressions that capture how changes in payout taxes affect the within-country difference in R&D investment across industries with varying dependence on external equity finance. The panel nature of our data not only enables us to include a rich set of fixed effects that flexibly control for alternative country-industry and country-year determinants of R&D investment, but also allows us to build instrumental variable (IV) estimators using lagged (within panel) information on payout tax rates. Both OLS and IV estimates indicate a strong, negative, differential connection between the tax rate on corporate payouts and R&D investment in more external equity dependent industries. For example, our findings suggest that increasing payout tax rates by an amount equivalent to a move from the 25 th to 75 th percentile in our sampled countries (on the order of 15 to 20 percentage points) causes the difference in R&D intensity across high (75 th percentile) and low (25 th percentile) external equity dependent industries to fall by an amount equivalent to between 3% and 10% of the sample average R&D intensity. In sharp contrast, higher taxes on corporate payouts have only minor (and typically insignificant) negative effects on investment in fixed capital, with corresponding estimates indicating that fixed investment differentials decline by just 0.4% when payout tax rates increase. These findings are robust to alternative measures of the payout tax rate, as well as numerous alternative sampling, modeling, and estimation choices.
Finally, we move from the cross-country, cross-industry analysis in the international panel to firm-level evidence from an important within-country shock to payout tax rates. Following several prominent studies (e.g., Auerbach and Hasset (2005) ; Chetty and Saez (2005) ; Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) ; Lin and Flannery (2013) ; Yagan (2015) ), we treat the 2003 dividend tax cut in the US as a quasi-experimental shock to the tax rate on corporate payouts. As these studies discuss, the 2003 tax cut is attractive for evaluating the effects of payout taxes because it was sizeable in magnitude, unanticipated, and expected to be long lasting. Using data on publicly listed US firms, we document a significant within-firm increase in R&D activity following the tax cut. The positive R&D response is differentially greater in sectors that are more dependent on external equity finance, consistent with our difference-in-differences estimates from the international panel. We also explore the differential effects of the tax cut using three indicators of a given firm's a priori sensitivity to the availability of external equity finance: age, cash flow generation, and payout ratio in the years prior to the tax cut. We find that the R&D response to the 2003 dividend tax cut is relatively stronger in young firms, firms with low internal cash flows, and firms with low payout ratios. Moreover, triple-difference estimates show that the tax cut has the strongest effect on R&D investment among the young, low cash flow, and low payout firms that are also located in industries with high external equity dependence. The quasi-experimental nature of the payout tax reform, together with differential effects in the firms and sectors that should be most sensitive to changes in the cost of external equity, provides strong additional indication of a causal link between capital income taxes and R&D.
Our study makes a number of contributions and is relevant for an active public policy debate on the effects and desirability of payout tax reform. Most notably, our work highlights an unappreciated and unexplored mechanism linking the taxation of corporate payouts with long-run economic performance. This evidence is most directly relevant for the influential literature on the economic effects of dividend and capital gains taxation, including the "new view" and "traditional view" debates about whether payout taxation will have any real effects at all. 2 As far as we are aware, this is the first study to emphasize the particular importance of payout taxes for equity-dependent activities, and the first to robustly document a negative connection between payout taxes and the R&D investments that drive growth in modern economies. 3 In this way, our focus differs from other recent efforts to understand how payout taxation affects the real economy. For example, Becker, Jacob, and Jacob (2013) show that payout taxes impact the allocation of fixed investment across different types of listed firms: as payout tax rates increase, fixed investment shifts away from firms that depend on external equity at the margin, and to firms with high internal cash flow. Alstadsaeter, Jacob, and Michaely (in press) exploit a payout tax reform in Sweden and find similar allocation effects in a broad sample of unlisted firms. Our work highlights a much different implication of the equity financing distortion that accompanies payout taxation: less overall investment in the equity-dependent activities that drive long-run growth. Similarly, the dynamic general equilibrium model in Gourio and Miao (2010) focuses on the impact dividend taxes have on the allocation of capital across firms, and estimates from their simulations suggest that lower payout taxes can increase aggregate productivity by enabling previously constrained firms to increase capital investment. Our study also points to a potential connection between payout taxes and aggregate productivity growth, but our findings suggest this connection works through R&D rather than capital accumulation.
Our findings complement recent work by Yagan (2015) , who uses US tax return data and a careful quasi-experimental design to evaluate the economic effects of the 2003 dividend tax cut. Exploiting the fact that the dividend tax cut affected some corporations (those with "C" status) but not others ("S" status), Yagan (2015) finds no evidence that the (large) dividend tax cut affected either capital spending or employee compensation. Though we take a different approach, our findings for fixed investment are consistent with Yagan (2015) , and our evidence from the international panel suggests the lack of an important (overall) fixed investment response to changes in capital taxes is a general phenomenon. Of course, our most important contribution relative to Yagan (2015) is to show that payout taxes do affect R&D investment, a real activity he does not study. 4
Our work also contributes the literature on the determinants of R&D activity, particularly the strands of this literature that study how financial factors and tax policies affect R&D spending. 5 Most of this work focuses either on the effectiveness of R&D tax credits (e.g., 3 It is notable that even the most ardent proponents of payout tax reform have not emphasized the potential link between capital income taxation and R&D, and have generally focused on business fixed investment as the primary mechanism through which lower taxes on dividends and capital gains may encourage economic growth (e.g., Hubbard (2005) ; Hubbard, Mankiw, Taylor, and Hasset (2012) ).
4 An important reason the Yagan (2015) setting is better suited for studying fixed investment than R&D is that the vast majority of R&D takes place in publicly listed firms, making it infeasible to extend the approach of benchmarking against a set of (unaffected) S-corporations to the study of R&D. For example, Brown et al. (2009) note that, in the early 2000s, public-firm R&D spending in the US is upwards of 90% of total industrial R&D reported by the NSF, while C corporations account for over 95% of claimed R&D tax credits (Karen E. Klien, "The R&D Tax Credit Explained for Small Business," BloombergBusiness, August 16, 2011 (http://www.bloomberg.com/small-business/the-rampd-tax-credit-explained-for-small-business-08162011 .html).
5 For a review of this literature, see Hall (2002) . Mansfield (1986); Hall (1993); Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) ; Wilson (2009) 
Thompson (in press)), or the sensitivity of R&D to changes in the supply of internal and external finance (e.g., Hall (1992) ; Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) ; Brown et al. (2009); Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2012) ; Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, and Eymard (2012) ). Our study is the first to show that tax policies affecting the cost of external equity finance have an important impact on R&D, over and above the effects of the broader institutional environment.
Finally, our findings are relevant for the design and evaluation of alternative tax systems (e.g., Slemrod (1990) ). A key contribution of our work is to highlight a negative but almost entirely ignored consequence of tax systems that favor debt over equity finance. This insight is most directly germane for discussions on the optimal rate at which to tax dividends and capital gains (e.g., Chetty and Saez (2010) 2 Theoretical mechanism and empirical predictions 2.1 Payout taxes, the cost of equity capital, and R&D activity
Though the real consequences of payout taxation continues to be the subject of much interest and debate, the financing distortion that arises from taxing dividends and capital gains is uncontroversial: higher taxes on corporate payouts make external equity (stock issues) more expensive than internal equity (cash flow). This "wedge" between the cost of internal and external equity finance reduces the incentive for firms with high cash flow and low investment opportunities to pay out capital and limits access to equity capital for firms that rely on external finance at the margin (Poterba and Summers (1984) ; Chetty and Saez (2010) ; Becker et al. (2013) ). While this financing distortion affects the allocation of equity capital across different types of firms, the extent to which it matters for real activity depends on the importance of stock issues as the marginal source of funds (Auerbach (2002) ). In particular, if debt is a perfect substitute for external equity then the capital tax wedge will not matter, since firms dependent on external finance can use debt when the cost of external equity increases. This leads to an important (but unexplored) implication: the real effects of payout taxation should be concentrated in the activities that are most equity dependent.
There are several reasons to expect that research and development (R&D) is one such activity. A number of studies discuss the various reasons why debt is likely an imperfect substitute for equity when it comes to financing R&D (e.g, Carpenter and Petersen (2002); Hall (2002) ; Brown et al. (2009) (2004)), while other work directly links changes in the supply of external equity with R&D investment (Brown et al. (2009); Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen (2013) ). 6
Economic magnitudes and empirical predictions
Even if R&D is equity-dependent at the margin, it is not obvious ex ante that payout tax rates will have an economically important impact on overall levels of R&D activity. First, the magnitude of the tax wedge may be insufficient to substantially affect R&D. In particular, in firms that depend on external equity issues at the margin, the responsiveness of R&D to an increase in the cost of external equity capital will depend on both the magnitude of the increase in the cost of capital and the elasticity of the R&D investment demand curveif investment demand is highly inelastic (rapidly declining marginal returns with additional R&D spending), or the size of the payout tax wedge is minimal, then the impact payout taxes have on R&D need not be large in magnitude. 7
Second, higher payout taxes will only have a negative impact on R&D in the firms that depend on external equity at the margin. In particular, higher taxes on corporate payouts shift the allocation of equity capital toward firms with high cash flows and away from firms that generate less internal cash flow and depend more on stock issues to fund investment (Becker et al. (2013) ). In our setting, the consequence of this shift in the allocation of equity capital is less R&D investment in the firms dependent on external equity (e.g., younger firms) and a relative shift in the location of R&D activity toward more profitable firms. If the firms dependent on external equity are relatively unimportant for aggregated (industry) measures of R&D -either because they are few in number or because they are less R&D intensive -then the aggregate economic impact of higher payout taxes will be minimal. That said, there are several good reasons to expect that firms constrained by access to external equity are particularly important sources of (aggregate) innovation. Most notably, there is evidence that smaller and younger firms -the firms that tend to be the most liquidity constrained and most reliant on external stock issues (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998) ; Hadlock and Pierce (2010) ) -account for a significant share of R&D activity in some economies (e.g., Brown et al. (2009) ) and are more innovative than their larger, more mature counterparts (e.g., Acs and Audretsch (1988) ).
In light of this discussion, the theoretical mechanism we emphasize points to three main empirical predictions. First, we expect a negative relation between payout tax rates and R&D, though the magnitude and economic importance of this relation must be evaluated 3 Data sources and sample construction 3.1 Cross-country data on payout taxes and R&D activity
We use the data on payout tax rates described in Jacob and Jacob (2013) . This data covers 25 countries over the period 1990 to 2008. Jacob and Jacob (2013) We merge the country-level tax data with information on R&D investment and capital accumulation at the country-industry-year level from the OECD's STAN database. This data source and level of aggregation is attractive for several reasons. In particular, the R&D measures in the STAN database are standardized for comparability across countries and over time, thus bypassing concerns about cross-country differences in the accounting treatment and reporting of R&D expenses by public firms (e.g., Bhagat and Welch (1995) ).
In addition, the industry-level measures are sufficiently aggregated to permit inferences on the broad economic effects of payout taxes, yet the STAN data has sufficient cross-sector coverage to estimate the differential effects of payout taxes across industries that vary in their reliance on external equity finance.
After dropping financial and regulated industries, and four countries from the Jacob and Jacob (2013) Table 3 we report sample average ratios of R&D-to-value added (R&D intensity) and capital accumulation-to-value added (CAPX intensity) for each industry included in the sample. Across all country-years we sample, the average R&D intensity 
Measuring an industry's technological demand for external equity finance
We use data from US firms to construct measures of each industry's technological dependence on external equity finance. Building on the insights in Rajan and Zingales (1998) , who use data from US firms to identify the industries whose growth should be most sensitive to financial market development, we assume that because the US has relatively well developed equity markets, the reliance by US firms on external equity issues is driven by the technological characteristics of the industry. Some of our tests will then explore whether payout taxation has a relatively stronger effect on R&D investment in industries with a greater technologically determined dependence on external equity.
For each US firm with coverage in the Compustat database, we sum net external equity issues (gross stock issues minus buybacks) and total assets over the 1980s, and use these summed values to construct a net equity issues-to-total assets ratio for each firm. We then find the median net equity issues-to-total assets ratio across firms in each industry and call this value industry External equity dependence. As we show, our results are robust to alternative measures of industry reliance on external equity, including measures based only on the financing activity of young firms and measures that scale new equity issues by total investment rather than total assets. The last column in Table 3 reports the External equity dependence measure for each industry. There is significant variation in External equity dependence across industries in the US, with sectors like Tobacco, Leather, and Textiles using little or no external equity finance, and sectors like Pharmaceuticals, Research and development, and Computing relying extensively on new equity issues for funding. 10
Evaluating the 2003 dividend tax cut with US data
In addition to our primary analysis at the country-industry-year level, we also use firm-level 4 Payout taxes and R&D investment across countries and over time
Baseline specification
Our initial regressions take the following form:
Here, R&D i,j,t is R&D divided by value added (R&D intensity) for industry j in country i in year t. Payout taxes i,t measures the level of payout taxation in country i at time period t using either Effective tax, Average tax or Dividend tax. X i,j,t is a vector of time-varying control variables. This conditioning set includes controls for the country's level of economic development (GDP per capita), equity market development (Stock market), tertiary school enrollment (Human capital ), government spending relative to GDP (Government expenditure), the sum of imports plus exports relative to GDP (Trade openness) and the lagged dependent variable (R&D i,j,t-1 ) to allow for partial adjustment and account for the persistence in R&D over time (e.g., Hall (2002) ; Thompson (in press) ). In addition to the standard set of country-level controls (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011)), we also control for major tax reform (Tax reform) at the country-year level using information from Becker et al. (2013) . Specifically, we include an indicator variable that takes on the value zero for the tax regime a country has at the start of the sample period, and switches to one when a country moves to a new tax regime. Broadly controlling for major tax reforms in this way addresses the potential concern that any estimated effects from changes in capital income taxes merely reflect other changes to the tax code that simultaneously
The symbols η i , η j and η t are sets of dummy variables controlling for country, industry, and year fixed effects, respectively. The country fixed effects control for all time-invariant country specific factors that may impact R&D investment, such as tolerance for risk-taking and institutional quality. The industry fixed effects control for any industry-specific attributes that are constant across time and countries, including the overall propensity to invest in R&D. The year fixed effects control for any time shocks common to all countries. 12
We pool the data across all country-industry-year observations and estimate equation
(1) using OLS, with standard errors clustered at the country level. The standard critiques of regressions like equation (1) center on omitted variables and the potential for reverse causality. For example, changes in payout taxes may be correlated with other (unobserved) country-specific factors that affect R&D investment, and the arrival of investment opportunities could at least theoretically be the impetus behind country changes in capital income tax rates. We address both of these concerns in more detail below by employing a richer fixed effects structure, shifting to specifications that isolate the differential effect of payout taxes across industries, using instrumental variables estimators, and focusing on a quasi-experimental shock to payout taxes in the US. The main advantage of starting with a general, descriptive specification like equation (1) is that it provides a straightforward indication of how strong the overall relation is between payout tax rates and industry levels of R&D investment. Such an estimate is useful for evaluating the economic implications of our findings, as it indicates whether the differential effects we focus on later in the paper result in net changes in an economy's overall level of R&D activity. Table 4 reports estimates of equation (1). In the first three columns we exclude the country control variables from equation (1) and report separate estimates of the R&D regression using the three different measures of payout taxation: Effective tax, Average tax, and Dividend tax.
Baseline estimates
In each case, the estimate on the payout tax measure is negative and statistically significant.
The estimates in columns (4)- (6) show that the negative association between R&D investment and payout taxation is even stronger when controls for time-varying country factors are included in the specification.
To evaluate the economic magnitude of these coefficient estimates, we consider what the estimates imply about the change in R&D investment for a reduction in capital tax rates equivalent to moving from the 75 th percentile to the 25 th percentile in Payout taxes. As shown in Table 2 , moving from the 75 th to 25 th percentile represents a change in Payout taxes of between 15 and 20 percentage points depending on the measure of capital taxes we use. Since the sample average Effective tax is approximately 20%, these magnitudes also capture the predicted change in R&D investment if payout taxes are cut from the sample average rate to zero. The values in the bottom row in Table 4 show that such a reduction in payout tax rates is associated with an overall increase in R&D intensity that amounts to between 2.5% and 4.9% of the sample average R&D intensity. These magnitudes reflect the average effect across all sectors, but as we show below payout tax rates only matter for R&D intensity in equity-dependent industries, and in these sectors the economic magnitudes are considerably larger.
Heterogeneity in the effects of payout taxes across industries
If payout taxation matters for R&D in the way we have argued, the negative association between payout tax rates and R&D should be strongest in the industries with a high technological dependence on external equity financing. We thus proceed by sorting industries based on the External equity dependence measure reported in Table 3 . We consider industries in the top quartile of External equity dependence the "high" equity-dependent industries and industries in the bottom quartile of External equity dependence the "low" equity-dependent industries. 13 We then estimate equation (1) separately using pooled observations from these 13 We get very similar results if we sort industries based on alternative measures of external equity dependence, or if we divide industries into "high" and "low" groups based on whether the industry's External two different groups of industries (with all other industries excluded from the regression sample).
We report these estimates in Table 5 . In the first column, we find a significant negative coefficient on the Effective tax rate for the sub-sample of industries with high External equity dependence. Notably, the coefficient estimate in column (1) is -0.034, which is larger in magnitude than the corresponding estimate for all industries reported in Table 4 . This estimate suggests that a move from the 75 th to 25 th percentile in Effective tax is associated with an increase in R&D investment in sectors that rely extensively on external equity issues by an amount equal to 7.03% of the sample average R&D intensity. In contrast, the estimate in column (2) for industries with low External equity dependence is quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.
In columns (3)- (6) we repeat this exercise using the Average tax and Dividend tax measures of payout tax rates. Consistent with the results using Effective tax, we find negative, statistically significant, and economically meaningful coefficients on Average tax and Dividend tax, but only in the sub-sample of industries with high External equity dependence. The coefficient estimates in columns (3) and (5) indicate positive effects of lower capital taxes on R&D that range from 6.5% to just over 9% of the sample average R&D intensity.
Overall, the results in Table 5 show that lower payout taxes are associated with economically meaningful increases in R&D investment. The evidence showing strong effects only in the most external equity dependent industries supports the equity financing mechanism we emphasize. We provide stronger evidence on the causal linkages between payout taxes and R&D in the results that follow.
5 Differential effects across equity-dependent industries
The specification
We now turn to a specification that isolates the within-country, across-industry differential effects of changes in payout tax rates. We follow an approach similar in spirit to the classic tests in Rajan and Zingales (1998) (RZ), but our approach differs in two important ways.
First, RZ are interested in identifying the differential effects of financial development on growth rates across industries with varying reliance on all types of external finance, whereas we are interested in the differential effects of payout taxation on R&D investment across industries with differing reliance on external equity finance. Second, RZ work with a pure cross-section of observations at the country-industry level, and we use a panel of observations at the country-industry-year level. Our approach exploits the time-series dimension of the equity dependence is above or below the sample median. data in several ways, most notably by using within-country changes in payout tax rates for identification and, later in this section, by using the panel to construct instrumental variables estimators.
The specification takes the following form:
The most notable differences between this specification and equation (1) are the nature of the fixed effects and the main coefficient of interest. To identify the differential effect of payout taxes across sectors with varying dependence on external equity finance, we include fixed effects at the country-industry (η i,j ) level, as well as a full set of country-year (η i,t ) dummy variables. Note that this is a richer fixed effects structure than is possible in the standard cross-sectional RZ-type regression, and it controls for a host of unobserved factors that may confound our inferences on the real effects of payout taxation, including any factors common to the same country-industry pair over time (such as R&D investment opportunities). In addition, the country-year fixed effects account for any time-varying country-level factors that may impact R&D activity across all industries (such as business cycle effects or the country's financial market development), so it is not longer necessary (or possible) to control for country-year characteristics like we did in equation (1). As a consequence, the vector of time-varying control variables (X i,j,t ) only includes factors that vary at the country-industry-year level, such as the lagged dependent variable and, in some specifications, the industry's growth rate.
The variable of interest is now the interaction between country-level Payout taxes and industry-level External equity dependence. A negative coefficient estimate on the interaction term indicates that the within-country difference in R&D intensity across high and low External equity dependence industries is higher (lower) when Payout taxes are low (high).
We thus have a difference-in-differences test, with the estimate on the interaction term reflecting differences in the impact of changes in Payout taxes across industries that differ in terms of their technological dependence on external equity finance. Differential evidence of this type permits stronger inferences about the causality of payout taxation, in part because it is evidence of a specific theoretical mechanism through which payout taxes affect R&D, and also because it flexibly accounts for standard concerns about omitted variable bias and specification error. 14
Baseline estimates
In Table 6 we report OLS estimates of equation (2). As before, we report separate estimates using the three different measures of the country payout tax rate: Effective tax (columns (1)-(3) ), Average tax (columns (4)- (6)), and Dividend tax (columns (7)- (9)). For each alternative measure of payout taxation, we report estimates using the primary measure of industry External equity dependence, as well as two alternative ways to measure industry dependence on external equity finance: External equity dependence young and Equity issues over investment. External equity dependence young is constructed the same way as our primary measure of equity dependence, except that we only use information from firms within the first fifteen years they appear in the Compustat database. The rationale for measuring equity dependence using only young firms is that firms tend to be the most reliant on external financing in the years immediately after their IPO (Rajan and Zingales (1998) ), suggesting that use of external equity by young firms may provide the best indication of an industry's technological need for external equity financing. The Equity issues over investment measure reflects the magnitude of net stock issues relative to the size of total investment spending.
Specifically, Equity issues over investment is equal to the net external equity issues to total investment (R&D plus capital spending) ratio for the median US firm in each industry over the 1980s.
In the first three columns of Table 6 we report OLS estimates of equation (2) using the Effective tax measure of capital taxes and the three alternative measures of industry reliance on external equity financing. In each case, the coefficient on the key interaction term is negative and statistically significant, indicating that higher payout tax rates have a disproportionately negative impact on R&D investment in sectors that depend more heavily on external equity financing. We repeat this exercise in columns (4)-(9) for the Average tax and Dividend tax measures of payout taxation and draw similar inferences. For each alternative measure of the country payout tax rate and industry external equity dependence, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at (at least) the 5% level.
To measure the economic magnitude of these differential effects, we use the coefficient estimates to predict how a move from the 75 th to 25 th percentile in the country Payout taxes measure will affect the difference in R&D investment between an industry highly dependent on external equity (75 th percentile of the dependence measure) and an industry with low external equity dependence (25 th percentile of the dependence measure). The final row of Table 6 shows that our estimates predict a positive differential effect of lower payout taxes that amounts to around 3% to 5% of the sample average R&D intensity.
Robustness checks and alternative mechanisms
In Table 7 we report some robustness checks on the baseline results reported in Table 6 .
In each case, we focus on the Effective tax measure of payout taxes and External equity dependence measure of industry dependence on external equity finance, but all findings hold for the other measures as well. In the first column we report results using the 20 non-US countries in the sample. We check the results without the US because we use the US to construct measures of industry external equity dependence (though it is important to recall that industry external equity dependence is measured over the decade that precedes the start of our sample period). The estimate in column (1) of Table 7 is almost identical to the corresponding estimate in Table 6 , showing that our inferences are not unduly influenced by observations from the US. Indeed, all of our findings and inferences are robust to excluding the US from the regression sample.
In the second column of Table 7 we drop Pharmaceuticals (ISIC 2423) from the regression sample. As Table 3 shows, the Pharmaceuticals sector is not only highly R&D intensive, but it is also the sector that depends most on external equity finance. As a consequence, it is reasonable to worry that our findings are being driven to a large extent by financing and investment activity in this one sector. But the estimates in column (2) show that this concern is unfounded. In fact, the estimated coefficient on the key interaction term remains statistically significant and actually increases in magnitude when we drop the Pharmaceuticals industry.
In the remainder of Table 7 we consider alternative specifications of equation (2). In the third column we include a full set of industry-year dummy variables to address any concerns one might have about sector-specific trends in R&D activity. We continue to find a significant negative interaction between the country Effective tax and industry External equity dependence after accounting for industry-year fixed effects. The final two columns in Table 7 show that the findings are robust to alternative conditioning sets. In column (4) we exclude the lagged dependent variable from the specification and continue to find a significant negative coefficient on the key interaction term. The estimated magnitude of the differential relation between payout taxes and R&D is much larger if we do not control for lagged R&D. In column (5) we control for sales growth at the country-industry-year level. Although we lose a significant number of observations when constructing the growth variable, our main estimates are largely unaffected after controlling for industry sales growth.
This test suggests that our findings are not explained by time-variation in country-industry investment opportunities that happen to be correlated with changes in country payout tax rates.
In Table 8 we rule out several alternative mechanisms with the potential to bias our estimates of the differential link between payout taxation and R&D. We augment the main regression with interactions between industry External equity dependence and four of the macroeconomic control variables we initially considered in the pooled regressions: Tax reform, GDP per capita, Stock market, and Human capital. The country-year dummies account for any effects these macro factors have on R&D across all industries, but it is possible that these macro conditions are both correlated with payout tax rates and differentially important for R&D across sectors with differing dependence on external equity, in which case our baseline estimates may attribute too much (or too little) influence to the level of payout taxation. The interactions between industry equity dependence and Tax reform (column (1)), GDP per capita (column (2)), and Human capital (column (4)) are all positive but statistically insignificant. In column (3), the interaction between equity market development (Stock market) and industry equity dependence is positive and statistically significant, consistent with the positive link between stock markets and R&D emphasized in prior work (e.g., Brown et al. (2013) ). In column (5) we simultaneously include all four additional interaction variables and the Stock market interaction continues to be the only new interaction term that attracts a significant coefficient. Most importantly, however, in all cases we continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on the Payout taxes x External equity dependence interaction, showing that these alternative macroeconomic factors are not behind the differential effects of payout taxation we document.
IV-GMM estimates
We now turn to instrumental variables (IV) estimates of equation (2). Though arguably unlikely, it is nonetheless possible that countries systematically adjust tax rates on corporate payouts in response to (anticipated) R&D activity in sectors with a high dependence on external equity finance. To address this potential source of endogeneity, we exploit the time-series nature of our data and use lagged information on payout tax rates to predict contemporaneous levels. 15 This approach provides a way to address concerns about the potential endogeneity of Payout taxes i,t when no obvious external instruments are available, while at the same time accounting for the dynamic panel bias that arises from including the lagged R&D term together with the country-industry fixed effect (Nickell (1981) (2011)), but its validity requires a number of conditions to hold in the data, some of which are fairly restrictive. In particular, lagged observations dated t-n (and deeper) are potentially valid instruments only as long as there is no n th -order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond (1991) ).
To implement this approach, we use generalized method of moments (GMM) and jointly estimate equation (2) in first-differences and in levels. For the regression in differences, we use lagged levels of the right-hand-side variables as instruments, and for the regression in levels we instrument with lagged differences of the right-hand-side variables. The advantage of using this joint estimation approach, rather than just estimating equation (2) in differences, is that it overcomes the weak instrument problem that arises from using lagged values of persistent explanatory variables in the differenced regression (Blundell and Bond (1998) ). 16 Note that the differencing accounts for the country-industry fixed effects, and we continue to include a full set of dummy variables to account for country-year effects. Though our estimates are robust to a number of different IV structures, our main estimates use lagged levels dated t-3 and t-4 as instruments for equation (2) in differences, and lagged differences dated t-2 for the equation in levels. Specifically, we use lagged time-series values from the same country-industry pair to predict the key Payout taxes i,t x External equity dependence j interaction term.
In Table 9 we report the IV estimates of equation (2). The first three columns report one-step GMM coefficient estimates using the three alternative measures of Payout taxes.
In each case, the IV-GMM estimate on the Payout taxes interaction term is negative, statistically significant, and large in magnitude. As the last row in Table 9 shows, the economic magnitude of the differential effect implied by the IV-GMM estimates is between 7% and 10% of the sample average R&D intensity.
As noted above, one concern with this approach is that lagged values of the explanatory variables are not valid instruments. At the bottom of Table 9 we report three key tests of instrument validity. First, statistics from m2 tests indicate no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, meaning it is valid to rely on lagged levels dated t-2 and deeper as instruments, as we have done. Second, we report p-values from a Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions, and a Diff-Hansen test of the validity of the additional instruments required for the levels equation. In each case the p-value is well above conventional significance levels, indicating that we cannot reject the null that the instruments are valid in any of the IV-GMM regressions.
The last three columns in Table 9 report a series of robustness checks on the baseline IV-GMM estimates. We focus on the Effective tax measure of payout taxation for these tests, but all findings hold for the other tax measures as well. The results in column (4) show that we continue to find a significant negative coefficient on the key interaction term if we adjust the instrument set and use lagged levels dated t-2 to t-4 for the equation in differences, and lagged differences dated t-1 for the regression in levels. The results in column (5) show that the results are also similar if we use a forward orthogonal deviations transformation (rather 16 It is valid to include the levels equation instrumented with lagged differences as long as those differences are not correlated with the country-industry fixed effect. We report specification tests with the estimation results suggesting this additional moment restriction holds in our setting. For a full discussion of the conditions this estimation approach requires, see Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . than first differences) to remove the country-industry fixed effects. Finally, the results in column (6) report estimates using two-step (rather than one-step) GMM in conjunction with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 17 Again, the coefficient estimate on the payout taxes interaction is negative, statistically significant, and similar in magnitude to the previous estimates. Though not reported in Table 9 , the results are also similar in all respects if we estimate the IV regressions with the additional interaction terms we explored in Table 8 .
Additional tests 6.1 Payout taxes and fixed capital investment
In this section, we shift the focus to investment in fixed capital rather than R&D. As discussed earlier, if debt financing is a closer substitute for (costly) external equity finance for tangible investments than for R&D, capital investments will be less sensitive to changes in payout tax rates. Moreover, sharp differences in the effects of payout taxes across different types of investment helps rule out alternative explanations for the strong effects on R&D we have documented. We therefore re-estimate equation (2) with CAPX intensity as the dependent variable and report the results in Table 10 . We report estimates using the three different payout tax variables in columns (1)-(3). In each case, the coefficients on the payout tax interaction terms are negative, though the estimate is only statistically significant at conventional levels for the Average tax measure in column (2). The IV-GMM estimate presented in column (4) is even positive, albeit economically small and far from being statistically significant. Most importantly, in each case the coefficient estimates point to a much weaker effect of higher payout taxes on CAPX intensity than on R&D intensity. For example, for the one statistically significant coefficient estimate, the estimate in column (2) suggests an economic magnitude that amounts to around 0.4% of the sample average CAPX intensity. In contrast, the lower bound estimates for R&D intensity from Table 6 are six to eight times that large. Thus, the strong negative association we document between payout tax rates and R&D does not extend to fixed capital investment.
Event study evidence: The 2003 dividend tax cut in the U.S.
We now turn to event study evidence on the effects of a change in payout taxation. Building on the arguments in several prominent studies, we treat the 2003 dividend tax cut in the US as a plausibly exogenous and unanticipated shock to payout tax rates (e.g., Brown et al. (2007) ; Chetty and Saez (2005) ; Lin and Flannery (2013); Yagan (2015) ). Extending our tests to this setting, we start by evaluating the overall change in firm-level R&D investment around the tax cut, and then strengthen the identification by focusing on the differential impact of the tax cut on R&D investment across sectors that rely more or less on external equity finance. Moreover, since we have information on R&D at the firm level, we can also check for differences across firms within industries -that is, if the mechanism linking payout taxes with R&D investment works like we have argued, the effects should be concentrated in the firms who are a priori most likely to depend on external equity, even within equity-dependent industries. we build up to triple-difference regressions of the following form:
Here, R&D k,t is the R&D-to-assets ratio for firm k in year t. On the right-hand-side, Post tax cut t is a dummy variable equal to one in years following the 2003 dividend tax cut (2003 to 2005) , and equal to zero otherwise (2000 to 2002). We interact the tax cut indicator with both External equity dependence j , which is industry j 's dependence on external equity finance, and alternative firm-level indicators of dependence on external finance (Firm characteristic k ). 18 X k,t is a time-varying vector of firm-level control variables, including cash flow-to-assets, the market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q), revenue growth, and the lagged investment variable, while η k and η t are firm-and year-specific fixed effects, respectively. 19 We focus on three different firm-level characteristics, computed using only observations from the pre-tax cut period (2000 to 2002) . The first characteristic is Young age, an indicator equal to one if the firm is within the first fifteen years since it first appeared in Compustat with a non-missing stock price, and zero otherwise. We split firms based on age because firms are more reliant on external equity in the years immediately following the IPO (e.g., Rajan
and Zingales (1998)), and several studies use age to proxy for a firm's ex ante sensitivity to the availability of external finance, in part because age is less endogenous than other potential 18 Both the industry groupings and the sample time period are different in the firm-level Compustat panel than in the main OECD data, so for these tests we re-compute the External equity dependence measure at the 2-digit SIC industry level over the decade immediately preceding the new sample period. Specifically, we sum net stock issues and total assets for each Compustat firm over the 1990s, construct a net stock issues-to-assets ratio for each firm, and take the median value in each 2-digit SIC industry to measure External equity dependence. The results are similar if we use 3-digit SIC industries, or if we compute the dependence measures over alternative time periods.
19 These are standard controls in firm-level investment regressions (e.g., Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) ; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) ).
sorting criteria (e.g., Brown et al. (2009); Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2009) ; Hadlock and Pierce (2010) ). The second firm indicator is Low cash flow k , which is set to one for firms in the bottom 25 th percentile of internal cash flow prior to the tax cut, and zero for firms in the top 25 th percentile (with all other firms excluded). 20 Finally, we define a Low payout k indicator as equal to one (zero) for firms in the bottom (top) 50 th percentile of total payouts (dividends and stock repurchases) to income in the years immediately preceding the tax cut.
If payout taxes affect R&D via an equity financing mechanism, we expect the 2003 tax cut to differentially affect R&D in the younger, low cash flow, and low payout firms.
We report estimates of equation (3) in Table 11 . We start in the first two columns by excluding the year fixed effects and interaction terms and focusing on the overall change in firm-level R&D intensity in the years surrounding the tax cut. In column (1) we use industry fixed effects and in column (2) we use firm fixed effects. In either case, the coefficient estimate on the uninteracted Post tax cut indicator is positive and statistically significant, showing that, on average, firm-level R&D is higher in the post-tax cut period.
While generally consistent with the negative link between capital taxes and R&D we observe in the international panel, the estimates in columns (1) and (2) do not permit strong inferences on the causal effects of dividend tax reform, most notably because contemporaneous business cycle effects may largely explain these broad changes in R&D activity. 21 We thus focus in the remainder of the table on differential effects across industries and firms. This approach effectively uses R&D activity in firms that should be less equity-dependent as a control group for evaluating the impact of dividend tax cut.
Thus, in column (3) we add year fixed effects and focus on the interaction between Post tax cut and industry External equity dependence (the levels terms are subsumed by the fixed effects). We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term, indicating that the 2003 dividend tax cut is associated with a positive differential increase in firm-level R&D investment in the industries that are more dependent on external equity financing. The economic magnitude at the bottom of the table shows that the difference between R&D investment across firms in industries with high (75 th percentile) and low (25 th percentile) External equity dependence is greater in the post tax cut period by an amount equivalent to around 5% of the sample average R&D intensity.
In columns (4)-(6) we interact Post tax cut with the firm-level characteristics rather than industry External equity dependence. These estimates show that the tax cut is associated with positive differential increases in R&D investment in young, low cash flow, and low payout 20 Alternative approaches, such as splitting at the median or top and bottom terciles give similar results. 21 Yagan (2015) discusses this concern in the context of evaluating the 2003 dividend tax cut on fixed investment spending. It is notable, however, that if we run the same regression on the same sample for fixed investment rather than R&D, we find very small and slightly negative coefficients on the Post tax cut indicator. If general business cycle effects drive the positive coefficient on R&D, it is not clear why fixed investment does not respond similarly.
firms. In each case, the magnitude of the differential effect on these firm characteristics is around 6% to 8% of the sample average R&D intensity.
In the last three columns we estimate the full equation (3). Our main variable of interest here is the triple-difference between Post tax cut, industry External equity dependence, and the firm-level characteristics. For each firm-level sort, the coefficient on the triple-difference term is positive and statistically significant. These results show that the effects of the 2003 tax cut are relatively stronger among the young, low cash flow, and low payout firms located in industries with higher External equity dependence.
We have estimated the same regressions using capital spending-to-assets in place of R&D and also find results consistent with our estimates from the international panel. In sharp contrast to the estimates for R&D in Table 11 , the overall effects for capital spending are near zero (and actually slightly negative). The differential effects are always positive but small, and only significantly above zero in two of the regressions (the industry External equity dependence and firm Low cash flow sorts). 22 None of the triple difference terms are sizeable in magnitude or statistically significant. Like our earlier findings, these results suggest that payout taxes have limited effects on overall levels of fixed capital investment.
The evidence from the 2003 dividend tax cut strengthens our conclusions in at least three ways. First, quasi-experimental evidence from a significant policy change also indicates a strong negative relation between dividend tax rates and R&D activity, consistent with our estimates from a much different setting (the international panel). Second, these tests show that payout taxes have differentially stronger effects on R&D investment in the sectors and firms that should be most affected by changes in the cost of external equity capital, supporting a causal inference. Third, we continue to find no important relation between payout taxes and fixed capital investment, which is both plausible (given the evidence from US tax returns in Yagan (2015) ) and consistent with fixed investments being less equity-dependent than investment in R&D.
Conclusions
This study documents an economically important negative relation between tax rates on capital income (dividends and capital gains) and R&D investment. Our analysis is based on two main ideas: i) taxing corporate payouts raises the cost of capital for firms that are dependent on external equity at the margin, and ii) R&D should be particularly sensitive to the equity-financing distortion that results from payout taxation because firms cannot perfectly substitute debt for (costly) external equity when financing risky, intangible activities. Using a broad panel of countries and industries, we find strong evidence that higher rates of payout taxation have a negative impact on R&D, particularly in industries where the typical firm is more dependent on external equity to finance investment. We also find support for these inferences by studying firm-level changes in R&D activity around the introduction of the 2003 dividend tax cut in the US.
We are not aware of any prior studies that evaluate the real consequences of payout taxation by focusing specifically on R&D. This shift in focus is important because the real effects of payout taxation should be concentrated in the activities that are most equity dependent. Indeed, one implication of our study is that by focusing almost exclusively on investment in physical assets, prior research may readily understate (or miss entirely) the most important (long-run) economic effects of payout taxation. R&D is of interest not only because it is a risky investment that is equity-dependent in nature, but also because it is widely viewed as a critical driver of innovation, creative destruction, and technological change in modern economies (e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992) ). Thus, the negative association between payout tax rates and R&D investment that we document suggests payout taxes have much broader macroeconomic implications than prior research indicates. Table 3 lists the 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries included in the study and reports average R&D intensity (column (1)) and CAPX intensity (column (2)) in each industry during the sample period 1990 to 2008. External equity dependence is net stock issues-to-total assets for the median US firm in each industry over the 1980s. Panel B reports pooled summary statistics across all countries, industries, and years. The values are reported as percentages. The data on investment intensity is from OECD's STAN database, and data on external equity financing in US firms is from Compustat. Table 4 : Payout taxes and R&D investment: Pooled regressions Table 4 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) Table 5 : Payout taxes and R&D investment: Sample splits by industry dependence on equity finance Table 5 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) with R&D intensity as the dependent variable. All regressions include R&D intensityt-1, country, industry, and year fixed effects, and the following six time-varying country control variables: GDP per capita, Stock market, Human capital, Government expenditure, Trade openness, and Tax reform. Results in odd (even) numbered columns are from regressions using a sample containing the high (low) equity dependent industries measured as the top (bottom) quartile of industries in terms of External equity dependence. The data on R&D is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables  1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average R&D intensity) an industry's R&D intensity is in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in either of Effective tax, Average tax or Dividend tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) Table 6 : Payout taxes and R&D investment: Differential effects across equity-dependent industries Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (2) with R&D intensity as the dependent variable. All regressions include R&D intensity t-1 , country-industry fixed effects and a full set of country-year dummy variables. The data on R&D is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Payout taxes is measured by Effective tax in columns (1)- (3), by Average tax in columns (4)- (6), and by Dividend tax in columns (7)-(9). External equity dependence is measured by External equity dependence in columns (1), (4), and (7), by External equity dependence young in columns (2), (5), and (8), and by Equity issues over investment in columns (3), (6), and (9). Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average R&D intensity) an industry's R&D intensity at the 75 th percentile in External equity dependence is with respect to an industry at the 25 th percentile when it is located in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in either of Effective tax, Average tax or Dividend tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Table 7 : Payout taxes and R&D investment: Robustness checks Table 7 reports OLS estimates of equation (2) with R&D intensity as the dependent variable. All regressions include R&D intensity t-1 , country-industry fixed effects and a full set of country-year dummy variables. The data on R&D is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average R&D intensity) an industry's R&D intensity at the 75 th percentile in External equity dependence is with respect to an industry at the 25 th percentile when it is located in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in Effective tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Table 8 reports OLS estimates of equation (2) with R&D intensity as the dependent variable. All regressions include R&D intensity t-1 , country-industry fixed effects and a full set of country-year dummy variables. The data on R&D is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average R&D intensity) an industry's R&D intensity at the 75 th percentile in External equity dependence is with respect to an industry at the 25 th percentile when it is located in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in Effective tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) Table 9 : Payout taxes and R&D investment: Instrumental variables results Table 9 reports instrumental variables estimates of equation (2) using a systems generalized methods of moments (sys-GMM) estimator. R&D intensity is the dependent variable. The estimates in columns (1)-(3) report one-step GMM estimates using t-3 and t-4 level values as instruments for the differenced equation and t-2 lagged differences as instruments for the level equation. The estimates in column (4) use lagged levels from t-2 to t-4 as instruments for the differenced equation and lagged differences at t-1 to instrument for the equation in levels. Column (5) uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences to transform the data (remove the country-industry fixed effect). Column (6) reports two-step GMM estimates with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. All regressions include R&D intensityt-1 and account for country-industry fixed effects and include a full set of country-year dummy variables. The data on R&D is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average R&D intensity) an industry's R&D intensity at the 75 th percentile in External equity dependence is with respect to an industry at the 25 th percentile when it is located in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in either of Effective tax, Average tax or Dividend tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-country-industry serial correlation are reported in parenthesis. The m2 test is asymptotically normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and the J-test and Diff-Hansen are chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. ***, **, and * stand for significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
(1) Table 10 : Payout taxes and fixed capital investment Table 10 reports estimates of equation (2) with CAPX intensity as the dependent variable. All regressions include CAPX intensityt-1, country-industry fixed effects and a full set of country-year dummy variables. The estimates in columns (1)- (3) use OLS, while the estimates in column (4) use a systems generalized methods of moments (sys-GMM) estimator with t-3 and t-4 level values instrumenting the differenced equation and t-2 lagged differences instrumenting the level equation. The data on fixed capital investment is from OECD's STAN database and the payout tax data is from Jacob and Jacob (2013) . The sample period is 1990-2008 and covers 29 non-financial and non-utilities industries across 21 countries. Detailed variable definitions and summary statistics are provided in Tables 1-3 . Economic magnitude measures how much higher (lower) (in percent terms relative to the sample average CAPX intensity) an industry's CAPX intensity at the 75 th percentile in External equity dependence is with respect to an industry at the 25 th percentile when it is located in a country at the 25 th (75 th ) percentile in either of Effective tax, Average tax or Dividend tax compared to a country at the 75 th (25 th ) percentile. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parenthesis in columns (1)-(3) and standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within-country-industry serial correlation are reported in column (4). The m2 test is asymptotically normally distributed under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and the J-test and Diff-Hansen are chi-square distributed under the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. ***, **, and * stand for significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
(1) Table 11 reports OLS estimates of equation (3) with firm-level R&D-to-total assets as the dependent variable. Post tax cut is a dummy variable equal to 1 (0) from 2003 (2000) to 2005 (2002) . Young age is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm's average age in the pre-2003 period is less than or equal to fifteen, and 0 otherwise. Low cash flow is equal to 1 (0) if a firm's average cash flow-to-assets ratio in the pre-2003 period is in the bottom (top) 25 th percentile of sampled firms. Low payout is equal to 1 (0) if a firm's average payout-to-income ratio in the pre-2003 period is in the bottom (top) 50 th percentile of sampled firms. The sample is from Compustat. All regressions include a set of time-varying firm-level variables: cash flow-to-assets, revenue growth, the market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q), and the lagged dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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